Issue on Appeal: Child Endangerment Jury Instructions
Background: Defendant-appellant Amy Rodriguez was indicted on 11 counts of child endangering in relation to her stepson, C.D. The indictment alleged that Rodriguez tortured or cruelly abused C.D. on various occasions between January 2018 and April 2021. However, the indictment did not specify which acts corresponded to which counts. Although the State presented detailed testimony, including a trauma timeline and specific acts of abuse, the jury instructions and verdict forms did not link these specific acts to the individual counts. Rodriguez was convicted on four of the 11 charges, but the jury was confused about which acts corresponded to the counts for which Rodriguez was convicted.
Legal Issue: Rodriguez argues that the trial court committed plain error by failing to provide the jury with instructions and/or verdict forms that specified the conduct related to each count of child endangering. Rodriguez asserts that this failure violated her constitutional rights to due process and to be free from double jeopardy, as it left her unable to determine which acts the jury found her guilty of and which acts led to acquittals.
Court of Appeals Analysis: The court found that Rodriguez’s conviction involved multiple counts of the same crime, and each count related to a different act of abuse. The trial court’s failure to link each count to specific evidence presented during the trial created confusion for the jury. Although the prosecutor referenced specific acts of abuse during closing arguments, the jury instructions and verdict forms did not clarify which act was tied to each count. The jury’s questions during deliberations highlighted this confusion. The court relied on previous cases, such as State v. Shaw and State v. Valentine, where the failure to distinguish between multiple counts of the same offense was deemed a violation of due process.
The court concluded that the error was plain and obvious, as the jury’s inability to discern which acts corresponded to which counts impacted Rodriguez’s substantial rights. The court also held that the failure to provide clarity in the instructions and verdict forms prevented Rodriguez from effectively challenging her convictions on appeal, and there was a reasonable probability that, without this error, the trial’s outcome would have been different. As a result, the court reversed the judgment and discharged Rodriguez from further prosecution for the offenses.
Conclusion: The trial court’s failure to provide the jury with adequate instructions and verdict forms specifying the conduct underlying each count of child endangering constituted plain error. This error deprived Rodriguez of her due-process rights and the ability to challenge the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. Given the jury’s confusion, the court reversed the judgment and discharged Rodriguez from further prosecution. Furthermore, the court held that retrial was precluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause, as there was no way to determine which offenses the jury acquitted Rodriguez of.
Dissent: Judge Winkler dissented, arguing that the trial court did not commit plain error. He emphasized that Ohio law does not require a trial court to include the defendant’s alleged conduct in the jury instructions or verdict forms to differentiate counts of the indictment, especially when the State linked each count to a specific act during closing arguments. Winkler noted that Rodriguez had not objected to the trial court’s approach and failed to challenge the sufficiency or weight of the evidence regarding the counts she was convicted of. He concluded that the trial court did not err and would affirm Rodriguez’s convictions.
State v. Rodriguez, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-240075, 2025-Ohio-53
Issue on Appeal:
Background: In March 2023, Kimberly Hahaj, a nursing assistant at Meadowbrook Care Center, was charged with gross neglect of a patient in violation of Ohio Revised Code (R.C.) 2903.34(A)(2), after an incident in May 2021 where she allegedly caused a resident to fall from a bed, resulting in serious injuries. The incident occurred when Hahaj attempted to turn the patient alone, contrary to the care instructions, which required two staff members. After the incident, Meadowbrook Care Center failed to preserve key evidence, including statements from witnesses and records related to the incident. The Ohio Attorney General’s office (OAG) conducted an investigation but lost crucial records and could not locate several potential witnesses due to staff turnover.
The State eventually filed the criminal complaint against Hahaj in March 2023, nearly two years after the incident. Hahaj moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the State’s preindictment delay had caused her actual prejudice, particularly due to the destruction of evidence and the unavailability of witnesses. The trial court granted her motion to dismiss, concluding that the delay was unjustifiable and prejudicial. The State appealed, arguing that Hahaj failed to demonstrate sufficient prejudice.
Legal Issue: The State appeals the trial court’s dismissal of the case, arguing that the trial court erred in determining that Hahaj was prejudiced by the delay in filing charges. Specifically, the State contends that Hahaj did not show actual prejudice from the delay.
Court of Appeals Analysis: The court reviewed the trial court’s decision de novo, meaning the court independently assessed the legal conclusions and application of law to facts, while deferring to the trial court’s factual findings, provided those findings were supported by credible evidence.
The court emphasized that to succeed in a preindictment delay claim, a defendant must prove that the delay caused “actual prejudice.” The court referred to Ohio Supreme Court precedents, including State v. Jones and State v. Luck, which require the defendant to demonstrate how the missing evidence or unavailable witnesses would have materially helped their defense. Simply pointing to lost evidence or missing witnesses is insufficient unless the defendant can explain how the loss impacted the trial outcome.
In this case, Hahaj failed to demonstrate how the lost evidence or unavailable witnesses would have helped her defense. Although she pointed to lost records and unavailable witnesses, she did not explain how this missing evidence would have either minimized or eliminated the impact of the State’s evidence or bolstered her defense. The court found that her claim of prejudice was speculative and lacked sufficient detail.
While Hahaj argued that the destruction of evidence by the State (in this case, discarded statements) constituted manipulation of the record, the court clarified that preindictment-delay claims focus on the natural consequences of delay, not misconduct or evidence destruction by the prosecution. The court did not address the destruction of evidence separately, as Hahaj had not demonstrated how the destruction of statements specifically prejudiced her defense.
The court concluded that Hahaj did not provide sufficient evidence to establish that the delay caused actual prejudice to her defense. As a result, the court reversed the trial court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, as the State had not yet been required to justify the delay.
Conclusion: The appellate court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the charge against Kimberly Hahaj, finding that she failed to prove actual prejudice from the State’s preindictment delay. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
State v. Hahaj, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-240033, 2025-Ohio-52
Issue on Appeal: Sentencing a Previous Violent Offender
Background: Defendant-appellant Abbey Eutsler was indicted on two counts of violating a protection order, both fifth-degree felonies, in December 2023 and March 2024. Eutsler pled not guilty to the charges and, in May 2024, entered a negotiated guilty plea for one count in each case. In exchange, the State dismissed one of the charges. On June 26, 2024, the trial court sentenced Eutsler to 63 days in prison for one count and 180 days for the other, to be served consecutively for a total of 243 days, but in the Van Wert County Jail under the Targeted Community Alternatives to Prison (TCAP) program. Eutsler filed an appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in sentencing her to prison instead of community control.
Legal Issue: The primary legal issue in this case is whether the trial court erred by sentencing Eutsler to prison instead of imposing community control as she argued that the record did not support a prison sentence under R.C. 2929.11. Additionally, Eutsler contended that her sentence violated R.C. 2929.34, which mandates that a sentence for a fifth-degree felony be served in an Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) facility, not a local jail, due to her prior convictions for violent offenses.
Court of Appeals Analysis: The court first addressed Eutsler’s argument about the sentence being contrary to law due to the felony-sentencing guidelines under R.C. 2929.11, which advocate for community control. The court noted that trial courts have full discretion to impose any sentence within the statutory range and that a sentence within that range is presumptively valid if the trial court considered the applicable sentencing factors. Eutsler’s sentence of six months in prison was within the statutory range, making it valid. The court also stated that, under R.C. 2929.11, trial courts do not need to make specific factual findings but must consider the principles of felony sentencing, including the protection of the public, rehabilitation, and punishment. Despite Eutsler’s disagreement with the court’s application of these principles, the court found no abuse of discretion.
However, the court agreed with Eutsler’s argument that her sentence was contrary to law due to her prior convictions for domestic violence, which made her ineligible for the Targeted Community Alternatives to Prison (TCAP) program under R.C. 2929.34. Since Eutsler had prior felony convictions for offenses of violence, the court determined that the trial court erred by ordering her to serve her sentence in a local jail instead of an ODRC facility.
Conclusion: The court reversed the trial court’s judgment concerning the sentence in case number CR-24-03-037 and remanded for further proceedings, as the sentence was contrary to law regarding the TCAP eligibility. However, the court did not find merit in Eutsler’s challenge to her prison sentence in case CR-23-12-146, dismissing her appeal in that case.