Appeal Issue: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Due to Mention of Prior Acts
The central issue of this appeal is whether the defense counsel’s mention of prior acts during opening statements constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Ineffective assistance is evaluated by two main criteria: (1) whether the counsel’s performance was deficient or objectively unreasonable based on prevailing professional norms, and (2) whether this deficient performance prejudiced the appellant. Other-acts evidence refers to a person’s previous crimes, wrongs, or other acts and is also known as other-crimes evidence or prior-bad-acts evidence.
In the current case, the appellant faced trial for the sexual imposition of an eight-year-old victim, with the victim’s testimony being the sole evidence presented by the state. During opening statements, defense counsel mentioned that the appellant’s stepdaughters had made similar allegations against him. This statement was deemed ineffective assistance because it introduced other-acts evidence about the alleged sexual abuse of the stepdaughters, which the state had not planned to present at trial under Evidence Rule 404(B). Furthermore, the jury was not instructed on the limited and proper purposes for considering the other-acts evidence presented by the state. As a result, the decision was reversed and remanded to the lower court for a retrial.
State v. J.J.S., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 23AP-441, 2024-Ohio-2645
Appeal Issue: Requirement to Inform Appellant of Potential Consequences During Plea Agreement and Sentencing
The issue in this appeal is whether the court must inform the appellant during the plea agreement and sentencing about the potential consequences of a violation. When sentencing an offender, a trial court is required to notify the offender of the specific prison term that may be imposed for violating the conditions of their sanction. This notification is a prerequisite for imposing a prison term for a subsequent violation.
In this case, the appellant, who was on probation for multiple crimes, pleaded guilty in exchange for community control. While on community control, the appellant was charged with burglary and subsequently sentenced to a prison term they were not aware was a possibility. Under R.C. 2929.19(B)(4), the trial court could not impose a prison term for the violation because it failed to inform the appellant at the sentencing hearing of the specific prison term they faced for violating community control. Consequently, the case was remanded to the trial court for resentencing without a prison term as an option.
State v. Schrack, 5th Dist. Muskingum Nos. CT2023-0070, CT2023-0071, 2024-Ohio-2654
Appeal Issue: Defense’s Obligation to Notify the State About Discovery to Maintain Speedy Trial Clock
The issue in this appeal is whether the defense must notify the state that they have no discovery to keep the speedy trial clock running. In this case, the time limit for a speedy trial was set to 180 days. If an appellant doesn’t respond to a prosecution’s discovery request within a reasonable time, it counts as neglect and pauses the speedy trial clock. The court decided that 30 days is a reasonable time to respond.
Here, the appellant requested a speedy trial, and the trial was supposed to start by May 20th. When the prosecution asked for discovery, the appellant didn’t respond because there was none. After 30 days, the clock was supposed to stop because the appellant didn’t notify the state that they had no discovery. Although the appellant filed a motion to dismiss in October, months after the speedy trial deadline, the clock should have paused when they didn’t notify the state. Consequently, the trial court’s decision to dismiss the case was reversed, and the case will now proceed to trial.
State v. Suleiman Abdullah Jama, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-23-057, 2024-Ohio-2657
Appeal Issue: Requirement for Court to Wait for State’s Response Before Ruling on a Motion
The issue in this case is whether the court must wait for the state to respond to a motion before making a ruling. Until the other party has a reasonable chance to file a written response, the court cannot reasonably consider the issues involved.
Here, the appellant requested to change their plea to not guilty, claiming the state failed to provide a portion of the evidence. The state argued that the appellant did receive the evidence, but it was not in an accessible format. The trial court sided with the appellant in one day, without giving the state a chance to respond. Consequently, the decision by the lower court was reversed, and the state will now have an opportunity to respond.
State v. Evans, 3d Dist. Paulding No. 11-23-09, 2024-Ohio-2679
Appeal Issue: Requirement for Hearing Before Denying a Motion to Seal a Record
The issue at hand is whether a trial court judge can deny a motion to seal a record without holding a hearing. According to the procedure, the judge should: (1) set a hearing date and notify the prosecutor; (2) hold the hearing no less than 45 days and no more than 90 days from the filing of the motion; and (3) instruct a probation officer or relevant department to conduct inquiries and provide written reports on the appellant as directed by the court. The judge must provide a factually supported reason for denying the motion.
In this case, the appellant was denied because the judge deemed him an “appropriate” candidate but statutorily ineligible. The judge denied the motion without a hearing or giving the state an opportunity to respond. A hearing was scheduled, and the judge should have followed the proper procedure to ensure a fair opportunity for both parties to be heard.
In conclusion, the appellate court remanded the case back to the trial court, instructing the judge to follow the correct steps in responding to the motion to seal.
State v. Hufford, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2023-12-113, 2024-Ohio-2667
Appeal Issue: Mandatory Notification of Post-Release Control During Plea Deal
The issue is whether the trial court must inform the appellant during a plea deal that post-release control is mandatory. The state conceded in this appeal, agreeing that informing the appellant is indeed mandatory, and acknowledged that the trial court erred in this regard. Consequently, the case was remanded to the trial court, allowing the appellant the opportunity to withdraw their guilty plea.
State v. Bradford, 4th Dist. Adams No. 24CA1193, 2024-Ohio-2669
Appeal Issue: Imposing Punishment for Probation Violation After Probation Period Expiration
The issue is whether the court can impose a punishment for a probation violation after the probation period has expired. The court has the authority to extend probation for minimal cause, with a violation being a valid reason for such an extension. During the extended probation, the court can hold a hearing to address the violation. At this hearing, the court can impose punishments based on the appellant’s initial sentencing.
In this case, the trial court issued an arrest warrant for the appellant’s violation without specifying the nature of the violation. After the appellant’s probation had expired, they were arrested, and a hearing was held, resulting in a 180-day jail sentence. However, the trial court failed to extend the probation upon discovering the violation, issuing only the arrest warrant. This oversight rendered the appellant ineligible for punishment under the community control guidelines. Consequently, the appellant was released from jail, and the judgment was reversed.
State v. Davila, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2024-T-0024, 2024-Ohio-2672
Appeal Issue: Imposing Punishment for Probation Violation After Probation Period Expiration
The issue is whether the court can impose a punishment for a probation violation after the probation period has expired. The court has the authority to extend probation for minimal cause, with a violation being a valid reason for such an extension. During the extended probation, the court can hold a hearing to address the violation. At this hearing, the court can impose punishments based on the appellant’s initial sentencing.
In this case, the appellant violated their probation while still within the probation timeline, and a warrant for the appellant’s arrest was issued. The probation was set to expire on January 30th. The appellant was arrested on January 28th, and the hearing was held on January 31st, resulting in a 180-day jail sentence. Because the hearing was conducted after the probation period expired and there was no continuation of the probation, the court was ineligible to punish the appellant for the probation violations. Consequently, the appellant was released from jail, and the judgment was reversed.
State v. Washington, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2024-T-0023, 2024-Ohio-2670